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Abstract
The question what really—ultimately, basically, and so forth—exists remains 
a fundamental question of philosophy. It is also, however, a prime example of 
how misleading it can be to try to answer a philosophical question without first 
taking pains to clarify it. In this case, clarification has turned out to be difficult 
and controversial, which leads to a meta-question: Is this apparently fundamental 
question—the ontological question—also a pseudo-question, a question that 
should be dissolved rather than solved? This paper argues for an answer that is 
somewhat Meinongian.
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1. The question what really—ultimately, basically, and so forth—exists 
remains a fundamental question of philosophy. It is also, however, a prime 
example of how misleading it can be to try to answer a philosophical question 
without first taking pains to clarify it. In this case, clarification has turned 
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out to be difficult and controversial, which leads to a meta-question: Is this 
apparently fundamental question—the ontological question—also a pseudo-
question, a question that should be dissolved rather than solved? Or does 
careful clarification allows us to appreciate the true ontological stakes? 
Reflection on these questions begins with two traditional criteria of 
existence, which I call the semantic and the causal. The semantic criterion 
is that whatever can be thought and talked about is real. If accepted, it also 
becomes a criterion of ‘ontological commitment’: we are committed to 
the existence or reality of what we take ourselves to be thinking or talking 
about. And this goes with the puzzling claim that ‘exists’—contrary to 
appearance—is not a predicate. 
The causal criterion is that if an object has causal standing it is 
real. It can be strengthened to a necessary and sufficient condition: 
So strengthened, I refer to it as the causal condition on existence. To have 
causal standing is to be an effect or have an effect, to cause or be caused, 
to act or be acted upon.
For this purpose we should understand ‘cause’ widely, not restricting 
it to our modern notion of a cause as something of which an intelligible, 
scientific account can in principle be given. The notion of causation relevant 
to the causal condition is the broad notion of productive power. Whether the 
scientific account exhausts that notion (or even captures any part of it) is 
a separate question. If, for example, as Kant suggested, noumena have the 
power to ‘affect’ phenomena in a non-natural way that lies beyond the scope 
of science, then the causal condition says that noumena are real. Equally, if 
God creates the world by some non-natural productive act of will, God is 
real; if Platonic forms somehow generate or produce or give rise to sensible 
appearances, they are real. If some normative realists believe that normative 
facts cause normative beliefs by a scientifically inexplicable productive 
relation, their view does not fall to the causal condition. In contrast, of course, 
if we think that the only intelligible causal relations are natural relations, 
relations that are objects of scientific inquiry, then the causal condition will 
lead us to conclude that all objects and facts are natural objects and facts. But 
the causal condition itself does not beg the question in favour of naturalism.
It has proved tempting to accept both the semantic criterion and 
the causal condition. That, in turn, poses challenges that have occupied 
philosophers. Apparently, for example, we refer to and think about numbers, 
or fictional objects, but numbers and fictional objects have no causal standing. 7 Existence
Yet if we accept both the criterion and the condition, this cannot be the case. 
Either we do not really refer to numbers or fictional objects, or else they 
have causal standing after all.
These difficulties lead many philosophers to reject the causal condition: 
specifically, to reject it as a necessary condition. I shall instead support the 
view that the semantic criterion should be rejected, while the causal condition 
should be accepted. However, my discussion here is not mainly about the 
case that can be made for this view. Rather, it aims to set out some of the 
view’s implications—though doing so will suggest how certain arguments 
against it can be blocked. 
In setting out the suggestion starkly, I am not forgetting the meta-doubts 
about whether any real question is at stake. Rather, I want to resist opposition 
on two fronts. On the one side are those who hold that the semantic criterion 
of existence should be accepted. On the other are those who hold that the 
search for criteria or conditions of existence is misguided, at least if this 
is thought of as a metaphysical question of ‘ontology.’ I come back to this 
scepticism about ontology in section 7. 
2. Some matters of terminology should be settled from the start. So consider 
this statement:
(1) There are characters in War and Peace who do not exist and 
characters who do. 
Here ‘exist’ is used as a predicate to distinguish between the purely fictional 
characters and the real people who feature in the novel. Equally, however, 
‘exist’ can be used, and often is used, to express the so-called existential 
quantifier. (I follow others in calling it the particular quantifier.) When it 
expresses the particular quantifier, ‘Fs exist’ has the same force as ‘there 
are Fs’; ‘a exists’ then says that (∃x)(a = x). Call this use of ‘exist’ the 
quantifier use. 
In the quantifier use, it is trivially true that whatever is referred to 
exists, since Fa entails (∃x)(Fx). On this use we have to substitute some 
other phrase for ‘does not exist’ in (1) – for example, 
(2) There exist characters in War and Peace who are not real and 
characters who are.8 John Skorupski
Both uses of ‘exist’ can be found in ordinary language. In this paper, however, 
I am not going to use ‘exist’ in the quantifier sense, but only as an ontological 
predicate with the sense found in (1). For the purposes of this paper, ‘exists’, 
‘really exists’ and ‘is real’ mean exactly the same thing. Thus, when we say 
that Pierre is one of the characters in War and Peace who does not really 
exist, we are saying:
(3) (∃x)(x is a character in War and Peace and x = Pierre and x does 
not exist).
I shall use the verb ‘to be’, as in (1), to express the particular quantifier, 
while denying that it has any ontological force. So I can agree with Quine 
that to be is to be the value of a variable; but I disagree that this has any 
ontological significance.
A major source of confusion here is that ordinary language has no 
systematic way of distinguishing the quantifier use and the ontological use. 
For example, to say that there still exist some difficulties to be solved in the 
planning proposal is not to make an ontological claim: it is the quantifier 
use. Equally, however, to say that these difficulties are real, or that they are 
not merely apparent but really exist, is not to make an ontological claim. 
Although this is a perfectly natural way to put it, it does not follow the 
convention I have stipulated. For the contrast between reality and appearance 
in this case pertains to objectivity, not ontology: to put it in terms of my 
convention, it does not merely seem that there are problems; there are 
problems. If, in contrast, we ask, ‘Did Homer really exist?,’ we are asking 
an ontological question. 
Both a sceptic about ontology and an adherent to the semantic criterion 
will question the contrast I have just made. The sceptic will say that I am 
relying on an intuition about what is ‘ontological’ which cannot ground any 
such contrast. I shall come back to this scepticism in the final section. In 
contrast, someone who accepts the semantic criterion will say that there is 
no distinction to be made between merely quantificational and genuinely 
ontological uses of ‘to be’ and ‘to exist,’ so the distinction I have stipulated 
between these two verbs is empty. (1), (2) and (3) are all misleading. ‘Exist’ 
should not be regarded as a predicate, so we must find some other way of 
regimenting what (3) tries to express, which eliminates reference to a fictional 
character in War and Peace who has the name ‘Pierre.’9 Existence
3. Taken as an ontological thesis, the semantic criterion is that whatever one 
can think and talk about exists. It is, to put it mildly, hard to see what case 
can be made for such a Parmenidean claim.1 On inspection, we see that the 
only condition that discourse about any topic must satisfy is that we know 
and can communicate to each other what we are talking about. We must 
be able to anchor the topics of our discourse by means of predicates they 
instantiate in such a way as to allow us to refer back to them and quantify 
over them. To get to the semantic criterion from this anchoring condition, 
there must be an inference from the sound point that successful reference 
requires the ability to identify what we are talking about to the conclusion 
that it requires that what we are talking about exists. And this inference seems 
completely gratuitous. You and I, for example, can discuss how attractive 
a character Pierre is. There is something we are both discussing and we 
both know what it is. We can discuss Pierre, refer back to the character 
we were discussing, disambiguate our reference where necessary by using 
a referential anchor such as ‘the young idealist in Tolstoy’s novel who gets 
involved with Free Masonry.’ Pierre instantiates that description, but that 
does not entail that Pierre exists.
As the last remarks imply, there is something about which we are both 
talking de re—namely Pierre. However that does not imply that Pierre exists:
(4) (∃x)(you and I are talking about x and x = Pierre and x does not exist)
seems straightforwardly true. So de re reference does not entail existence. 
There has to be a res about which we are talking; it does not follow that it 
has to exist. We can apply that to intentional identities:2
(5) The flying saucer Peter thought he saw is thought by Joseph to have 
landed in his field, but the air force thinks it does not exist.
What obstacle is there to the straightforward parsing?—
(6) (∃x)(Peter thinks x is a flying saucer he saw and Joseph thinks x 
landed in his field but the air force thinks that x does not exist.)
1 I take the description of the semantic criterion as ‘Parmenidean’ from Priest (2009).
2 Geach (1967).10 John Skorupski
Note that in this case we are not dealing with a fictional object but with what 
I will call a putative real. Or, rather, that is what we are dealing with on the 
assumption that the flying saucer in question does not exist. If the air force 
is wrong, then the flying saucer is not a putative real; it is real. In that case, 
the air force wrongly thinks, of something that exists, that it does not exist. 
The question whether the flying saucer exists or not is not settled by (6): 
it follows neither that the supposed flying saucer about which we are talking 
exists, nor that it does not exist.
4. Can we perhaps argue from the theory of truth to the semantic criterion? 
Consider the correspondence theory of truth, according to which a proposition 
is true just if it corresponds to a fact. Assume also that a fact consists in or 
supervenes on the possession of a property by some existent object, or the 
obtaining of a relation among some existent objects. Hence, on this theory, 
any truth entails the existence of some objects. We shall have to come back 
to the notion of fact, and to the truth of the correspondence theory of truth, 
but let us accept this reasoning for the moment. 
Consider then:
(7) In the stories about him, Albert Campion lived in Bottle Street.
The reference is to a fictional detective and a fictional street, but the statement 
is true. In the Albert Campion mysteries, it is made clear that Campion lives 
in a flat in that street. So, by the correspondence theory, it is a fact that in 
the stories about him, Albert Campion lived in Bottle Street, and that fact 
must consist in or supervene on the instantiation of a property or relation 
by some existent objects. As indeed it does: in this case, it supervenes on 
facts about the writing of certain detective stories by an author and their 
reception by an audience. 
None of this, however, entails that the references to Albert Campion 
and Bottle Street are merely apparent. They are genuine references to two 
non-existent entities. Note also that I might know (7) to be true, know it to 
be a statement about some novels, that is, to be about some fictions produced 
by an author, and still not know whether Bottle Street exists. Indeed, I might 
not know whether Albert Campion really existed, just as I may not know 
whether Prince Bagration, in War and Peace, really existed. 11 Existence
In similar fashion, the truth of (6) supervenes on facts about Peter, 
Joseph and the air force. These are real entities, whereas the flying saucer 
may not be. But whether or not it is, the reference to it is genuine. Truths 
about fictional objects and putative reals are truths about non-existent entities, 
but they are mind-dependent: They supervene on facts about existent minds.
5. So far, I would like to say that I have been following the tradition of 
Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong, rather than that of Quine. Contrary to 
Quinean orthodoxy, ‘being presented’ is not the same as existing. Twardowski 
and Meinong were right about that—but not, I think, about some other 
things. In particular, there is the question of merely possible objects. We 
should not, I believe, agree with them that such objects have being, because 
we should not agree that such objects are ‘presented.’ 
Consider the following:
(7) The golden mountain is made of gold.
Is it true? If it is, it entails that there exists a golden mountain. That is because 
only what exists can be made of gold. Being made of gold is an existence-
entailing property. So, since there exist no golden mountains, (7) is false or 
neither true nor false. But further, there is no golden mountain. In (7), the 
singular term ‘the golden mountain’ has no reference. True, there might have 
been a golden mountain, but it does not follow that there is one.
In contrast, suppose Peter believes that there exists a certain mountain 
made of gold. It is, he thinks, somewhere near Zurich, is owned by Swiss 
bankers, etc. In that case, we have an anchoring condition for a putative real: 
the golden mountain that Peter thinks exists, which he thinks is near Zurich, 
which he hopes to buy a share in. We might refer to it, whether or not we 
know it does not exist, as Peter’s mountain. It is a putative real: (∃x)(x = 
Peter’s golden mountain). However, it is still not true that Peter’s mountain 
is golden, since being made of gold is an existence-entailing property. All 
that is true is that it is thought by Peter to be golden.
In general, we should draw a contrast between the actual and the 
possible, as well as the real and the irreal. Fictional objects and merely 
putative existents are actual but not real. The realm of the actual is the realm 
of what there is. Let us now stipulate that the term ‘irreal’ covers whatever 12 John Skorupski
there is but does not exist. Then we can say that the realm of the actual 
consists exclusively of the irreal and the real.
Consider then the following exchange:
—You could have had children.
—They would have had a bad father. 
Suppose both statements are true. It does not follow that there are ‘possible 
objects’ to which we are referring. There are no such objects. No possible 
children are ‘presented’ to us in this exchange. That is, there is no irreal 
object, a possible child, of which it is true, de re, that we are referring to it.
Equally, there could have existed a mountain which had the properties 
that Peter thinks Peter’s mountain has. But here, too, in making that modal 
statement we are not referring to any possible mountain. There is no object 
which might have been a mountain and might have had those properties, 
including existence, of which we are speaking. I might say that Peter’s 
mountain might exist, meaning it epistemically: for all I know, it exists. But 
if it does not exist, then it is false that it might have existed.
To put it another way, if Peter’s mountain does not exist, it necessarily 
does not exist. This follows from the fact that if Peter’s mountain is a merely 
putative real, then its property of being the object of Peter’s thought is 
an essential property. Similarly, if we consider a possible world in which 
a detective called ‘Sherlock Homes’ exists, lives in Baker Street, etc., we are 
not supposing something about Sherlock Homes. Being invented by Conan 
Doyle would not be among such a detective’s properties, whereas it is an 
essential property of Conan Doyle’s fictional detective. Thus I agree with 
Kripke that actual objects that do not exist could not have existed.3 Non-
existence is an essential property of non-existent actual objects.
6. So far we have noticed two categories of irreality—purely fictional objects 
and putative reals. I believe there is a third, very important category of 
irreal objects of discourse: normative objects – the distinctively normative 
properties and relations about which we speak when we speak normatively.4 
I have argued elsewhere that all these properties and relations are reducible to 
what I call reason relations, so I shall speak only of these. Nothing hangs on 
3 See Kripke (1981; 1972); also (2013).
4 The assertions which follow are defended at length in Skorupski (2010). For a brief 
outline, see Skorupski (2012).13 Existence
this: If there is an irreducible plurality of normative properties and relations, 
the ontological points I want to make would apply equally to them all.
Consider the following:
(8) Were someone to experience undeserved suffering that it was possible 
to alleviate, that would be a reason to do so.
This says that a certain fact, were it to obtain, would be a reason to do 
a particular action. The fact would stand in that reason relation to the action. 
This seems to be a truth, and a purely normative—not a factual—truth.
The difference between a factual and a purely normative proposition 
is just that: to assert a factual proposition is to claim that some fact obtains, 
whereas to assert a purely normative proposition is not to assert that some 
fact obtains. Thus, whereas the claim that a fact obtains can—obviously—be 
true only if the fact in question does obtain, the truth of a purely normative 
assertion does not depend on the obtaining of any facts. Purely normative 
content is genuine content, true or false, but not factual content.5
What then is the status of the reason relation in which the fact stands 
to the action? If it were real, (8) would be a factual claim. However, denying 
that it is real does not entail that it is either a fictional object or a putative 
real. These latter two claims would correspond to two views in current 
meta-ethics—fictionalism and error theory—which both assume that purely 
normative assertions are factual assertions. The right response, I believe, is 
to insist that purely normative assertions are indeed genuine assertions about 
reason relations, with truth-apt content, but that they are not factual assertions. 
Reason relations are irreal—but the contrast with fictional objects 
and putative reals is fundamental. Assertions about the latter are factual 
assertions, and the facts in question, if they obtain, do so because they 
supervene in part or whole on facts about minds. Thus, these assertions 
are assertions about mind-dependent facts. Purely normative assertions, in 
contrast, are not factual and not mind-dependent. 
Reason relations are objective irreals, neither mind-dependent nor 
world-dependent. That is how they make knowledge of self and world 
possible. If they were real, they would just be some further items ‘in the 
mind’ or in the world ‘outside the mind,’ and the question of how the mind 
5 This standpoint necessitates rejecting the correspondence theory of truth in favour 
of a minimalist theory. 14 John Skorupski
knows the world, including these items in it, would remain opaque. If these 
points sound excessively dramatic, note that they simply follow from the 
basic claim that there are purely normative truths about reasons, and that 
they are not factual truths. We can quite innocently, without lurching into 
ontology, ascend an order and talk about the reason relations that feature in 
these truths about reasons. But equally, instead of saying that thought about 
the world is possible because reason relations are neither mind-dependent 
nor world-dependent, we could say that thought about the world is possible 
only because it is inherently responsive to normative truth, and because 
that responsiveness rests solely on spontaneity, in Kant’s sense; i.e., as 
contrasted with receptivity. Irrealism about reason relations is implicit in 
this view of reason.
7. I come now to two sceptical reactions to the position on existence that 
I have sketched.
First, someone might ask whether there is more than a verbal difference 
between the position about existence that I have outlined here and platonism. 
“You mean by ‘actual’ (it might be said) what the platonist means by ‘exists,’ 
and you mean by ‘exists’ what the platonist means by ‘has causal standing.’”
What then does the platonist say about fictional objects and putative 
reals? To have a perfect translation from our terms to his terms (is actual 
= exists; exists = has causal standing) he must say they exist, though they 
have no causal standing. There is then a serious question about why this 
position should be called platonist, since platonism is a position about 
abstract objects in particular.6 In any case, most platonists are likely to go 
with common sense by denying that such objects exist. The semantic criterion 
then requires that apparent references to such objects must be paraphrased 
out—with all the difficulties that attend that project. Thus we do not have 
a perfect translation of the irrealist view—according to which, for example, 
there is a non-existent fictional character known as Sherlock Holmes about 
whom we can perfectly straightforwardly talk.
Secondly, someone might ask whether I am not, in describing reason 
relations as irreal, inviting metaphysical inflation. Saying that there are Fs, 
or that Fs exist, this person might say, are ways of talking that have various 
6 I argue in Skorupski (2010) that abstract objects are objective irreals in the way that 
reason relations are; indeed, more strongly, that they are all reducible to reason relations.15 Existence
unproblematic uses in various contexts. The mistake is to think that there 
is some overarching philosophical question about whether Higgs particles, 
numbers, reason relations, purely fictional characters or unresolved problems 
‘really exist.’ These questions are first-order questions internal to their 
respective domains of discourse. When we say that a character in a novel 
really did exist (and was not just invented by the author), we are saying 
one thing; when we say a problem really exists and is not just an apparent 
problem, we are saying another. When we say that there exist two prime 
numbers between 16 and 22, we are saying a third, and when we say that 
Higgs particles really exist, we are saying a fourth. The beguiling idea of 
a single ‘world,’ or ‘reality as a unified domain,’ is a will o’ the wisp. There 
is no such thing as a criterion of ‘ontological commitment’—that phrase 
means nothing. Ontology should be swept away as a pseudo-subject. What 
then remains, as is especially clear on the minimalist view of truth, is a mere 
tautology: it is true that there are Fs if and only if there are Fs.7
On this view, the term ‘realism’ (as well as the term ‘irrealism’) should 
be discarded from meta-normative debate, since both suggest that some 
significant ‘ontological’ question is at stake when we ask, for example, 
whether there are three distinct reason relations or just two.
I have considerable sympathy for this view; I would be happy to 
dissolve, rather than resolve, the debate between realism and irrealism. 
But I am afraid this would be too quick. For we do, it seems to me, have 
a conception of unified ‘Existence,’ or ‘Reality.’ It is not a philosophical 
construct; it is integral to our thinking. If a quantum physicist or 
a metaphysical theologian gives a public lecture entitled “The Nature of 
Reality,” examining the fundamental structure of matter, or its relation to 
mind and God, we understand perfectly well what they are talking about and 
why they give their lecture its title. We do not accuse them of leaving reason 
relations out, or of treating reality as though it were a single domain. We think 
reality is a single domain, and we are deeply interested in its ultimate 
constituents. Reason relations are not part of the Nature of Reality—not 
Constituents of Existence—when ‘Reality’ and ‘Existence’ are so understood. 
7 This is the view T. M. Scanlon takes in Scanlon (2013), except that he wishes to 
retain a role for ontology and thus thinks my remark about sweeping away ontology 
(in Skorupski 2010) too sweeping (Scanlon, p. 24). However by ‘ontology’ I meant 
a unified theory of ‘ontological commitment’, as envisaged by Quine, and Scanlon agrees 
that there is no such theory.16 John Skorupski
A strategy that seeks to treat the question whether reason relations are real 
or irreal as a mere pseudo-question fails to take this important aspect of our 
notion of reality, or ‘the world,’ seriously. 
Existence in this sense is causal standing, in the wide sense of ‘causal’ 
that we have discussed. Not that ‘exists’ means ‘has causal standing.’ Rather, 
when we use the word ‘existence’ in a certain way, what we are referring to 
is causal standing. That existence, understood in this way, is causal standing 
is an a priori but not an analytic identity.
8. What then if some metaphysician insists that reason relations are causally 
inert existents in just this sense of ‘existence?’ A fundamental difficulty 
remains for such a position. Knowers can cognise existents distinct from 
themselves only through some form of receptivity—be it scientifically 
describable, metaphysical or magical. But reason relations are not known in 
any such way. Our knowledge of them is not based on any form of receptivity, 
in the Kantian sense referred to in section 6, but derives from spontaneity 
alone. It follows from the pure spontaneity of normative knowledge that 
its objects are irreal; but crucially, in the absence of assumptions about 
existence and truth that have been rejected here, it does not follow that they 
are subjective.
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